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Abstract
What is the role of the constants of nature in physical theory?  I hypothesize that
0the observable universe, u , constitutes a Universal Turing Machine (UTM ) constrained
by algorithmically random logical tape parameters defining its material properties (a
physical UTM ).  The finite non-zero empirical values of Planck’s constant, h, and other
constants of nature exemplify those logical parameters.  Their algorithmic randomness
is necessary and sufficient for the consistent operation of a physical UTM.  At any given
i ntime, t , these constants correspond to the first n random halt digits, S , of Chaitin’s
Halting Probability, S.  Planck’s equation  and Boltzmann’s relation 
0are shown to apply to the operation of a physical UTM.  The genomic evolution of u  in
0constants of nature space (CON space) from an undecidable state in u 's Planck era to
its current ordered condition occurs through the algorithmically random, symmetry-
0breaking addition of new constants to the laws by which u  operates — a process called
0 plogical tunneling.  The temperature of u  for t#t  is shown to be .  The energy
dissipated when a physical UTM clears its memory after each computation is proposed
as a candidate for cold dark matter (CDM ) and is calculated to comprise 87.5% of the
M 0matter content, S , of u .  This result concurs with current astronomical estimates that
0 087% of the matter content of u  consists of CDM. The energy incorporated in u  through
the process of logical tunneling from  undecidable states of the complete Universe, E, to 
0decidable states of u  is suggested as a candidate for the unexplained “dark energy”,
XS , hypothesized to drive the accelerating cosmological expansion of space and
0believed to constitute 66% of the critical mass, S , of the observable universe.
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2I. Unsolved Problems in Physics: Why is physical reality quantized?  Why is
mathematics the language of physics?  Can laws of physics explain the constants of
nature? 
Quantum mechanics and its extension, quantum field theory, are powerful 
theories but no one knows why they work.  Planck’s quantum hypothesis and the
quantization of quark-gluon fields by his successors are inspired guess-work  but efforts1
to quantize gravity have been unsuccessful.  While string/M-theory may succeed in
quantizing General Relativity, even if it demonstrates its mettle as “Theory of
Everything” (TOE), the theory provides no explanation as to why our universe is
characterized by a fundamental length scale of some particular value.2
Is there some property of any mathematical theory of physics that requires the
quantization of physical reality?  Why do Planck’s quantum and other constants of
nature have their observed values?  Why is mathematical reasoning such a powerful
tool for expressing the systematic relationships among phenomena studied by physics
and other natural sciences?  The evidence is overwhelming: nature appears to obey
mathematical laws everywhere and for all  time.  So far as is known, constants of
nature, including Planck’s constant, are inexplicable “facts” and mathematics simply
works extraordinarily well in the physical sciences.   Is the “unreasonable3,4,5
effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences”  evidence for a principle of6
physics in its own right?  Is there a “reason” why the constants of nature are
inexplicable facts?
Herein I argue that the foregoing problems, the first concerning the quantization
of physical reality and the values of the constants of nature and the second concerning
the efficacy of mathematics in the natural sciences, are siamese twins: quantization and
algorithmically random constants of nature are necessary and sufficient for the laws of
physics to operate consistently and therefore to be mathematically expressible.  Some
cosmological consequences of randomness in the laws of physics are also explored.
3II.  Proposal: Turing Mechanics: Any Physical System is a Mathematical Machine
To account for the striking correspondence between mathematical thought and
our experience of physical reality, I propose that the universe itself constitutes a
mathematical theorem-proving machine — a computer.  Is that hypothesis supported by
observational evidence?  The hypothesis extends the formal theory of the Universal
Turing Machine and its mathematical equivalents, Alonzo Church’s 8 calculus and the
theory of general recursive functions, to physical systems defined by arbitrary, that is,
algorithmically random, parameters specifying the material properties of any particular
computer.  7, 8
Hypothesis: Principle of  Mathematical Physics (PMP): Every law of physics
and every state of a physical system corresponds to some program of a
Universal Turing Machine (UTM).
The Church-Turing thesis asserts that every computer is equivalent to some
program of a Universal Turing Machine.   PMP is the Church-Turing thesis applied to9
the physical world.  Therefore:
0Theorem II-1:  The rational and observable universe, u , and every subsystem
thereof is a computer program that can be simulated by a Universal Turing
Machine.
The physics derived from PMP and Theorem II-1 will be called Turing Mechanics (TM).
The Principle of Mathematical Physics is motivated by four considerations.  First,
it accounts for the uncanny efficacy of mathematics in modeling the physical world. 
Second, in all of mathematics and physics there is only one “theory of everything” that
has survived every challenge to date: namely, Turing’s theory of computation and its
formal counterparts embodied in the works of Church and Gödel , as extended by10
Gregory Chaitin .  In the attempt to construct a “theory of everything,” it is11,12,13,14,15
seldom considered what one means by everything and whether that “everything” is the
same as “rational” or computable.  Turing’s theory of computation is the prime
4mathematical candidate for a physical theory of everything not only because the theory
is demonstrably universal but also because Turing’s and Gödel’s work defines
“everything” precisely in terms of completeness.  Turing’s theory specifies the
properties that a physical theory of everything must possess if it is to model the
relationship between completeness and rationality in the universe.  It is, therefore, rich
enough to permit an isomorphism between our mental conception of the universe and
the physical universe itself.   Third, the mathematics of all currently accepted theories16
of physics breaks down in some domain — notoriously in the Planck domain believed to
characterize the nascent universe.  The works of Turing, Gödel and Chaitin specifically
address the issue of what happens when a mathematical formalism reaches its limits as
one crosses the boundary between decidable theorems and undecidable theorems that
can be neither proved nor disproved within mathematics.  Thus their work may enable
us to understand what happens logically when equations of physics yield a singularity. 
Fourth, because their work establishes the existence of true but undecidable theorems
in mathematics, one can model the logical relationship between arbitrary constants of
nature and the dynamic transformations of physical reality that we symbolize in the laws
0of physics specific to our universe, u .
The existence of undecidable theorems in mathematics requires one to
0distinguish between the observable or “rational” universe, u , consisting of the evolution
of all physical systems whose states can be computed by an algorithm consisting of a
finite number mathematical relationships expressed in a finite number of symbols and
0 0the complete Universe, E, consisting of u  plus all states that are consistent with u  but
which can never be computed by its algorithms.  Given the incompleteness of 
mathematics, PMP implies that the rational universe modeled by finite laws of physics is
only part, indeed a very small part, of the complete Universe.  (Figure II-1)
5Figure II-1
0The observable universe, u , comprises all decidably true states " while the decidable
universe comprises " plus all decidably false states f.  As will become apparent from
0Figure IV-1 where I model the evolution of u  in constants of nature space (CON
0 0 0space),  relative to u , f relative to u  consists of all points not on the trajectory of u  in
0CON space.  Throughout this paper “universe” (lower case) always refers to u ;
“Universe” (capitalized) always refers to E.
oThe contrast between u  and E can be stated precisely in terms of the following
definitions:
Definition II-1: The computable or decidable (“rational”) formulae of a system is
the set of formulae for which there exists an algorithm (law of physics) capable of
formally generating any member of the set or its negation by the application of
the algorithm in a finite number of steps.
Notice that Definition II-1 requires that a UTM always halt on some member of the
computable set or its negation.
6Definition II-2: The recursively enumerable (listable) formulae of a system is the
set of formulae for which there exists a finite algorithm (law of physics) capable
of formally generating any member of the set by the application of the algorithm
in a finite number of steps.
Recursive enumerability is a weaker condition than computability in that it only
asserts which formulae are members of the set; it asserts nothing about determining
which formulae are not computable by the algorithm.
Definition II-3: A formula is said to be formally undecidable if neither the formula
nor its negation can be formally generated by the laws of physics in operation at
any given time in a finite number of steps unless that formula is assumed as an
ad hoc axiom of those laws.
Definition II-4: A set of formulae is said to be algorithmically random if each
member of the set is undecidable relative to any other subset of the formulae.
As will be discussed in §V, a sequence of formulae is also algorithmically random if the
number of bits addressing the shortest program capable of generating all members of
the set is equal to the number of bits required to address all members of the sequence.
oIn terms of Definitions II-1, through II-4 the states of u  are computable by the
o oalgorithms defining u ; the states of E consist of all the decidable states of u , ö, plus all
ostates, â, that are formally undecidable by the algorithm(s) defining u .
It is often asserted that quantum computers can perform computations that are
impossible to carry out on a Universal Turing Machine.   Such is not the case.  A17
quantum computer can be modeled as the Feynman path integration of an ensemble of
Turing machines operating in parallel along each of the virtual particle paths.  It can be
shown that any set of parallel Turing machines is equivalent to a single UTM.   I am not18
saying that a quantum computer cannot perform certain computations faster than
computers constructed as a classical Turing machine.  Rather I am only asserting that
when a UTM is supplied with the material principles of a quantum computer, then it can
perform any computation that can be performed by a quantum computer.
7Any particular computer is specified by material parameters.  These parameters
distinguish, for example, an abacus from an electronic computer.  Similarly, any law of
physics requires the specification of parameters appropriate to the type of system being
considered. These parameters must be incorporated in the program of a Universal
Turing Machine in order to perform any computation.  When the parameters are
included as input, a UTM can simulate the behavior of a physical system operating
under any set of dynamical laws  — so long as one subscribes to PMP which19,20
requires that all laws of physics be mathematical in the sense defined by Church and
Turing.21,22
A  UTM is a program; it is software, not hardware.   Turing machines define23
formal relationships between symbols that are themselves meaningless; they are purely
syntactical programs.  A UTM can include lines in its program specifying the physical
parameters characterizing the hardware upon which a program is to operate.  Indeed,
the program must specify these parameters; otherwise one cannot perform any
particular computation.  Even though these hardware parameters must be included in
the program, they do not determine what computations a UTM can perform.  An
abacus, an electronic computer and a quantum computer can each compute any
natural number, provided that the number is computable.  Thus, each can operate as a
Universal Turing Machine; however, specific values of the hardware parameters
certainly affect how fast one can solve any particular problem.  Definition II-5 reflects
this situation:
Definition II-5: A Theorem Proving Machine (TPM) is a Universal Turing
Machine whose program includes values of the hardware parameters
defining the particular physical machine upon which a computation is
performed.
In §III I briefly describe a Turing machine and suggest that the hardware
parameters referred to in Definition II-5 characterize the properties of the tape upon
which a UTM operates when reading and writing a program.  In §IV I shall argue that
some possible values of the hardware parameters are not permissible on logical
8grounds.  In §V I shall argue that the specific permitted values of these parameters can
never be computed by formalized Peano arithmetic; they must be added as
independent axioms to the Peano axioms.24
Employing Definition II-5, Theorem II-1 can be stated more precisely:
0Theorem II-2: The universe, u , and every subsystem thereof is a
theorem proving machine, TPM.
Theorems correspond to states of a system or of a subsystem thereof; the “proof” of a
state corresponds to the transformation of some given “initial” state (axiom or theorem
as the case may be) into the designated state by the application of a precisely defined
irule (recursive function) to the initial state.  When a TPM proves a state s  from some
i -1 i -1 i iother state s , the program P:s  ÷ s   is said to “halt” on the state s .
III. The Turing Machine
The following remarks concerning Turing machines borrow closely from John
Casti’s presentation.25
Turing machines constitute the most general of the four types of language
acceptor in the Chomsky hierarchy.   All computers have two components: a tape upon26
which sequences of symbols are written and a black-box language acceptor (LA) that
transforms symbols on the tape (input data) into new symbols on the tape according to
precise rules.  (Figure III-1.)
9Figure III-1
The transformation of a symbol on a tape requires three steps: first LA accepts
or “reads” the symbol on the tape (in this instance the “0“ under the “eye”); second, LA
erases the existing symbol on the tape momentarily creating a blank space on the tape;
third, LA writes some new symbol on the (momentarily) blank space and moves the
tape one space to the left or right depending on the machine’s program.   The program27
may also contain branching instructions that cause LA to move one or more tape
spaces to the right or left depending what symbol is being read by LA.  A branching
instruction does not alter the symbol under the read/write head.   Upon reaching some
desired tape, state LA halts operation and the theorem corresponding to the state of the
machine is said to be “proved.”  Any sequence of such transformations, including the
instruction to “halt,” is called a Turing-Post Program.   Branching statements can be28
ieliminated by allowing LA to possess a finite number of internal states {A }.  A program
can then be written as a table describing the action to be taken for each possible
symbol-state combination. 
Any given table corresponds to just one program among the countable infinity
that might be constructed to perform specific tasks.  Turing’s insight was to construct a
standard program that could interpret (read and translate) a suitably coded version of
any particular program supplied as input data on its tape.  The standard program can
10
then simulate the actions of any other program.  The standard program is called a
Universal Turing Machine.
From Theorem II-2 it follows that formal systems, computer programs and
dynamical systems in physics are equivalent.  The following table (after Casti)29
summarizes the relationships among them:
Table III-1
Formal System Computer Program Dynamical System
abstract symbols tape symbols (marks) number field
possible symbol strings possible tape patterns state manifold 
(phase space)
symbol string tape pattern state
(point in phase space)
grammar (formation rules) set of admissible tape
patterns
constraints (prohibited
regions in phase space)
starting axiom(s) input tape pattern initial state
logical rules of inference Turing-Post programs vector (force) field
proof sequence sequence of tape patterns trajectory (curve) in phase
space
theorem final tape pattern when the
program halts or goes into
an infinite loop
attractor (relative to prior
points in trajectory)
symbol and string
separation rules
tape parameters: size of
tape segments, tape
speed, tape strength
symmetry-breaking
parameters: constants of
nature
The first eight rows of Table III-1 characterize the universal properties of formal
systems, computer programs and dynamical systems which enable these systems to
compute any computable number.  The bottom row designates those hardware
parameters that define any particular system when the universal properties of all such
systems are realized in a specific (physical) computer or dynamical system.  For the
11
remainder of this paper I shall consider whether any logical requirements limit the tape
parameters to certain permissible values.
IV. Consistency, Objective Laws of Physics and Quantization
The most important property characterizing any physical system is that it operate
consistently.  If the laws of nature harbor an inconsistency, then every formula would be
a theorem formally provable from those laws.   Were such the case, it would be30
impossible for us to test (falsify) a theory of physics by experiment or any other means. 
What we might believe to be objective knowledge would constitute only personal
prejudice.  More generally, no TPM and no physical system could decide, by any
conceivable rules of inference or process of computation, what its next state should
become given its current state.  No objective laws of nature could exist.  In this sense,
all properties of a physical system derive from the consistency of the laws governing its
behavior.
For example, if Planck’s radiation law were based on an inconsistent set of
axioms, you could assert that the temperature of the photosphere of the sun is 5,800 K;o
I could assert that it is 10 K or even 0 K.  Both of us could derive our conflicting6  o o
conclusions from Planck’s law and it would be impossible to design an observing
instrument to distinguish between these conflicting assertions.
In mathematics one can require, by methodological fiat, that any argument
leading to an inconsistency is to be rejected for the reason that concept of proof breaks
down.  One is free to mandate this procedure because mathematics constitutes a
human artifact that we construct according to our purposes.  If the rules of procedure
are accepted by all players in the game of mathematics, that is what mathematics is.  In
physics, one does not have this liberty and neither does any physical system — per
Theorem II-2.  If we are to employ mathematical reasoning to understand the physical
12
world, one must find empirical evidence for the consistency of nature.
Observed phenomena that are consequences of suspected laws of physics are
not acceptable as evidence for the consistency of these laws.  Employing the
regularities of nature to confirm the latter’s consistency assumes the very consistency
that one seeks to demonstrate.  Rather, one requires evidence for some property of the
physical world that makes consistency possible.
The ability to prove every formula from an inconsistency has a converse with
profound implications.  If the laws of physics operate consistently, there must exist at
least one state of nature (formula) that is not derivable from those laws.  Therefore one
must demonstrate at least one fact (formula) of nature that one can prove to be
undecidable from any conceivable laws of physics.    From Theorem II-2 it follows that
any qualifying demonstration depends upon the universal characteristics of effective
computation embodied in the operation of a TPM.
The demonstration will proceed in three stages:
C In this section it will be argued that quantization of the Turing machine tape is
necessary for the consistent operation of any TPM.
C In §V it will be shown that the particular values of the tape quantization
parameters in any universe are algorithmically random.  It follows that their
values, if they can be determined, are sufficient to establish the consistent
operation of any mathematical laws of physics.
N vacC In §VII I shall suggest that the empirical constants of nature h, G , and c
0correspond to the tape parameters characterizing the TPM, u , at the Planck
scale.  Experimental determination of their finite, non-zero values demonstrates
0that the model of u  as a TPM is not vacuous and constitutes evidence
0necessary for the consistent operation of all laws of physics for u .
To begin, consider the Turing machine tape. (Figure III-1)   Overprinting of one
symbol on another is not permitted.  It follows that the tape must possess three material
properties.  The first is quantization. The tape must be divisible into segments of finite
13
non-zero length, h, in some appropriate phase space so that symbols can be
unambiguously printed on it and can be completely erased from it.  The length must be
greater than zero; otherwise, symbols printed by TPM would spill over from one
segment to another and overprinting would result.  Conversely, unless the symbols
themselves were infinitesimal, LA would only read an infinitesimal fragment of each
symbol on each zero-length segment as input to its operations and could not interpret
its input.  If, however, the symbols were infinitesimal, then the quantity of printer’s ink
required to emboss one symbol on the tape would differ by an arbitrarily small amount
from the amount of ink required to emboss some other symbol.  Thus any given symbol
would be indistinguishable from its adjacent symbol.   Similarly, the length of a tape31
space cannot be infinite.  If it were, no matter how far LA moved under its reading head,
LA could never scan all the printer’s ink embossing the symbol and LA could not be
certain that the symbol it unambiguously distinguished the symbol it is reading from any
other symbol on the tape — which is equivalent to requiring the quantity of printer’s ink
embossing each symbol to differ from symbol to symbol by an arbitrarily large amount. 
The second property is a maximum tape velocity.  The tape must move at most a
finite number of segments for each computation completed by TPM.   The tape cannot32
shift an infinite number of segments between computations because the presence of
infinitely distant branching instructions is equivalent to providing LA with an infinite
number of internal states.  In that case, internal states would correspond to an alphabet
of indistinguishable primitive symbols differing by an arbitrarily small extent from each
other.   This situation implies that, when the tape happens to advance in one direction33
only, there is a maximum finite velocity, c, at which changes in the computational
results printed on a segment can propagate along the tape: namely, a shift of one tape
segment per computation.
The third tape property is logical cohesion.  The tape must not “tear” under any
operating conditions to which it is subjected when moved through the language
acceptor.  Were it to do so, a TPM’s program could split into subroutines of arbitrary
14
length at least one of which might lack the essential instructions, U, required to carry
out any computation.  In that situation, there would exist at least one (fractured)
algorithm incapable of distinguishing between one symbol and another.
Of the three tape properties, logical cohesion, unlike quantization and maximum
velocity, seems “unphysical” in that it constitutes a formal property of arithmetic.  The
dichotomy is only apparent.  Given PMP every formal property corresponds to physical
property and vice versa.  The formal property expresses the requirement that, if a
theorem is proved once, then it must be possible to reprove the theorem at any later
time.  Logical cohesion, manifest as a constant G, expresses the coupling between the
axioms and the theorems of any formal system.  Physically, a Turing machine tape can
never tear and every state of a system is irrevocably coupled to every past state of the
system.34
In sum, the distance by which TPM advances its tape between computations
must be finite and non-zero corresponding to the physical manifestation of one bit of
information.  Therefore, if one defines R to be the length of a tape segment, then
{ R 0 ù * 0 < R < 4 }.  Rational values of R can be encoded as natural numbers, ù.  
0Furthermore, because Theorem II-2 applies to all subsystems of u , its formal
mathematical properties are scale invariant; that is, the tape for every computation
process is quantized but the value of the quantization constant varies from scale to
scale.  The definition of a system’s scale and the significance of scale invariance are
presented formally in §VI.
Despite the foregoing plausibility arguments, the pragmatic criterion of
distinguishability is ad hoc; it simply “works.”  Why, ultimately, is overprinting prohibited? 
Does the finite non-zero length of a tape segment reflect some logical constraint
necessary for the operation of a TPM?
iSuppose that overprinting were permitted.  A computer could print two states, s
15
j iand s  =~s , on the same tape space — a contradiction.   If overprinting were permitted,
no computer could consistently interpret the value of its own prior state(s) as input to its
current computation.  Since reasoning from a contradiction renders every formula
provable, if the operations of TPM are inconsistent, all possible states are formally
i iindistinguishable.  The very notion of a distinct state evaporates since s  =~s .  But that
is precisely what happens when the length of a tape segment is either zero or
infinite—no two symbols can possibly be distinguished by any logical criterion or by any
physical means.  In sum, the equivalence of the logical and physical prohibitions
against overprinting is a consequence of Theorem II-2 and the requirement that TPM
operate consistently.
The foregoing results are summarized by:
Theorem IV-1: The non-zero finite quantization of the TPM tape is
0necessary for the consistent operation of u  or any subsystem thereof.
0Graphically, u  can be uniquely characterized by a set of points in a three-
dimensional tape parameter space that delimits possible values of the arbitrary
constants in those laws subject to the constraints: 0#h, G, c #4.  This space will be
called constants of nature space (CON space).  The three dimensions correspond to
the properties of quantization, logical cohesion, and maximum tape velocity labeled h,
G, and c in Figure IV-1.  In §VII, I suggest why the values of these tape properties
N vaccorrespond to the familiar physical constants h, G , and c .
16
             Figure IV-1
 Constants of Nature Space
iFigure IV-1 suggests that it is possible to have multiple decidable universes, {u },
i i ieach characterized by particular values of the constants h , G , c .  Such is indeed the
ocase.  Were there only one decidable universe, u , then there must exist a rule
0 00specifying why CON space is restricted to just the specific values of  h , G , c
o 0 00characterizing u  and no others.  In that case, since h , G , and c  characterize all
decidable universes, they would be part of the program for U — a contradiction since
these constants must be algorithmically independent of U if U is to be consistent. 
0 iHereafter, u  refers specifically to the decidable universe that we can observe; u
0designates the i  decidable universe formally similar to u  but characterized by ath
0different trajectory in CON space.  There exist at least !  decidable universes.  Notice
i jthat all states of u  are undecidable relative to u  and vice versa.
It is important to distinguish between the value of a point in CON space and the
address bit in a program occupied by that value.  Each arrow in Figure IV-1
corresponds to the addition of a new address bit to the length of the programs being
operated upon by a TPM.  The addition of a new address bit, that is an arrow in the
evolution of a system, adds numbers (states) to the repertory of numbers that can be
computed by the TPM.  These numbers could not have been computed by TPM prior to
 Later in this section, it will be shown that the logical cohesion prohibits a decrease in the numberb
of states computable by a TPM.
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the addition of the new address bit.  By contrast, given a fixed number of bits
addressable by a TPM, permutation of the values of the addressable bits only moves
the destination of  each arrow within a given volume of CON space.  Volume in CON
space corresponds to the set of all numbers computable by a TPM with programs of
length # .  As I shall discuss in §VI, the evolution of the laws of physics has two
different connotations: first, the permutation of states computed by a TPM with
programs of a fixed length; second, an increase in the number of states computable by
a TPM.   When I assert that laws of physics change over time, I refer to changes in theb
addressable bits of a computer program.  Permutations do not change the information
gained as a result of an interaction with a physical system.
iIn §V it will be argued that the evolution of any given universe, u , is defined by
the set of points tracing a segmented curve in CON space as more and more constants
iof nature are added to the laws of physics for u .  Each triplet of constants defines a
i idifferent scale of computation occurring in u .  The state of u  is the set of all points in
i 0CON space associated with u .  Notice that logical cohesion requires the state of u  to
comprise all bend points on an entire curve, not just the most recently added point.  It
ifollows that, at any given time, t , TPM may be performing computations on all scales
0 ithat have been added to u  up to t .  Notice further that the state is defined in terms of
tape parameters, not the usual geometrical and mechanical variable of physics.  As is
evident from the ability to construct the fundamental Planck scales of geometric length,
mass and time from h, G, and c, geomechanical variables grow out of the process of
computation; they are not a background stage upon which computation occurs.
The process of adding constants to the laws of physics is best described as a
0logical tunneling from the undecidable states, â, of E to the decidable states, ö of u
(Figure II-1).  Logical tunneling will be symbolized as â ÷ö although strictly speaking
0one should append the subscript u  to ö to indicate that the terminus of a tunneling is
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0 iour universe, u , and not some other universe, u .  We shall see later that the process is
unidirectional; ö ÷â is prohibited on logical grounds.  The analogy with quantum
tunneling is deliberate.  For, just as quantum tunneling is the probabilistic mechanical
process by which a particle-wave penetrates a potential energy barrier greater than its
kinetic energy, logical tunneling is the probabilistic computational process by which a
constant penetrates the logical potential barrier between â and ö.  The probabilities of
quantum mechanics are given by the Schrödinger equation; in §V we shall find that
logical tunneling probabilities are given by the algorithmically random Chaitin halting
probabilities for programs of length n.  Translated into physical computers, that is
TPM’s, in §VI we shall demonstrate that the temperature of â is 0 K whereas theo
temperature is ö is always >0 K.  Thus the analogy with quantum tunneling iso
complete; a constant, which embodies a set of programs that may be input to a TPM, is
penetrating a potential barrier that is greater than its kinetic energy.
There exists one very important exception to the constraint 0#h,G,c#4: namely,
a TPM all of whose theorems are mutually undecidable or algorithmically random. 
These theorems are consistent with each other because no one theorem or any
collection thereof asserts a property that negates the properties of any other theorem. 
They are logically independent.  No subset of such theorems suffices to prove any
other member of the set.  In this case, the values of h,G and c are themselves
undecidable.  Such systems are guaranteed to exist by Gödel’s First Theorem and have
0significant physical consequences for u .   At the end of §V, it will be argued that one
can attribute a “temperature” of 0 K to such a system.  Then, given the incompletenesso
0 0of u , the set of algorithmically random states “surrounding” u  in CON space exerts a
0 0(negative) vacuum pressure on u  that may explain the cosmological expansion of u .
Before ending this section it is important to point out the while the tape
Nconstants, h,G and c discussed here look like the familiar physical constants h,G  and
vacc , we have no right to automatically equate the two families of constants.  The tape
constants specified in this section are logical properties that must characterize the
19
machine tape if a TPM is to avoid overprinting and operate consistently.  Only in §VII
will I argue that we are justified in equating the tape constants h,G and c with the
N vacempirical geomechanical constants h,G  and c .
V. Symmetry-Breaking and Algorithmic Randomness in the Laws of Physics
Theorem IV-1 specifies the necessary condition for the consistent operation of
the laws of physics.  I now consider sufficient conditions for their consistency.
If the laws of physics are consistent, there must exist at least one state of nature
(formula) that is not derivable from those laws.  Thus the experimental measurement of
0one such formula among all the formulae characterizing u  is sufficient evidence for the
0consistent operation of the laws of physics governing u  and every subsystem thereof. 
In order to qualify as evidence of sufficiency, one must prove that the candidate formula
is formally undecidable with respect to any possible laws of physics absent that formula.
0Do undecidable formulae exist among the states of u ?  Given Theorem II-2, the
existence of such formulae is guaranteed by Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem.
(Gödel-1)   Thus the observation of undecidable formulae is precisely what one35
requires for sufficient evidence of the consistency of the laws of physics.  The existence
0of undecidable formulae among the states of u  implies that the laws of physics are
0incomplete at any given moment in the history of u .  Gödel’s Second Theorem
(Gödel-2) asserts that the formalized arithmetic of (ù,+,x) cannot formally prove its own
consistency.   As one might expect, among those undecidable formulae is the formula36
0corresponding to the statement, “The operation of the laws of physics governing u  is
consistent.”   But which formula or formulae?37
The necessity of tape quantization suggests that the measurement of a specific,
non-zero value of the quantization parameter will provide sufficient evidence for the
0consistent operation of u  or any subsystem thereof.  In order to show that it is sufficient
 Algorithmic entropy is also called algorithmic complexity or algorithmic information content.c
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evidence, one must prove that any specific value of the quantization parameter is
0algorithmically random with respect to all other states of u  and with respect to the
0values of all other parameters that could possibly characterize u .  I now claim that
symmetry-breaking constants of nature in the laws of physics correspond to the
successive bits of Chaitin’s halting probability, S , for a TPM where:
iDefinition V-1: S is the probability that a computer program, p , chosen at
0 i irandom, will cause u  to halt on at least some state s  0 {s } / S.  S is the set of
0 iall possible states of u .  At least some s  0 S are undecidable states.
n nDefinition V-2: S  is defined to be the first n bits of S.  S and S  are,
orespectively, the total probabilities that u  will halt on any state and the probability
othat u  will halt on at least one state requiring n bits or less to address.
i oDefinition V-3: S  is defined to be the probability that u  will halt on some state
requiring exactly i bits to address.
Gregory Chaitin has proved that the individual digits of S are algorithmically
irreducible random numbers.   Knowledge of any subset of the digits of S provides not38
the slightest hint as to the value of any other digit.  Therefore measurement of the
specific value of one or more of those bits of S, corresponding to one or more
0constants of nature for u , constitutes sufficient evidence for the consistent operation of
0u .  The specific values of the constants of nature in the laws of physics characterizing
0our universe, u , are the result of a random process for which there can be no prior
explanation.  Their values are simply random facts only determinable by experiment. 
No theory can explain them.  The random process of generating the bits of S will now
be shown to correspond to successive symmetry-breakings of the laws of physics.
The algorithmic entropy, K(s ),  of a binary sequence, s , is defined as the length* c *
in bits of the shortest program, p , that computes s  on a UTM.  Because K is defined as* *
2 pthe number of bits addressing the shortest program, its magnitude is of order log (N )
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pwhere N  is the binary number encoding p .  Formally, *
(V-1)
The symbol 2 s*2 designates the length in bits of a binary string s*.
UIn terms of K (s ) herewith an alternative definition of algorithmic randomness to*
that given in §IV:
Definition V- 4:  A sequence s  is said to be algorithmically random if *
U2p *2 = 2s*2 to within an additive constant.
UThe subscript “U ” in V-1 indicates the machine dependence on a  of any
computation even though any UTM can perform the same computations.  The additive
Uconstants, a , constitute the length in bits of the string required to specify the tape
oparameters defining u .
i UFor any given physical machine, U , as 2 s*2 increases, 2a 2 becomes relatively
insignificant.  However, if one performs a sequence of computations on different
physical machines, the size of the binary sequence  coding all the tape
parameters can equal .  For example, if one performs every calculation on a
different machine, then  to within an additive constant corresponding to
the number of bits that define the machine-independent universal Turing machine
program, U.  The fact that gives rise to a dual representation of
randomness: namely, instrumental or mechanical randomness defined in terms of the
number of physical machines performing a computation rather than by the number of
steps comprising a program as is the case for algorithmic randomness.
In sum, the evolution of a system has equivalent dual representations:
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• In the algorithmic representation a system’s evolution is conceived as a
i i,i -1bit-stream corresponding to the tape parameters, {a } / {a }, of successive
iTPM’s expanding one law of physics containing that constant of nature, a , into
the next.
• In the mechanical or instrumental representation a system’s evolution is
i i,i -1conceived as a bit-stream corresponding to the tape parameters {s } / {s } of
isuccessive TPM’s expanding one instrument receptive to that initial condition, s ,
into the next.
In the algorithmic representation the free parameters of the evolution are the tape
i, i -1 i, i -1parameters {a }.  When {a } contains the minimum number of elements capable of
i i, i -1generating the states {s }, then the elements of {a } are conventionally called
i, i -1“constants of nature.”  The elements of the set {a } comprise the points of CON
space.  In the instrumental representation the free parameters are the states
i, i -1 i i, i -1{s } / {s }.  When {s } contains the minimum number of elements capable of
i i, i-1generating the tape parameters {a }, then the elements of {s } will be called “initial
i, i -1conditions.”  The elements of the set {s } comprise the points of initial conditions
space (IC space).  Hereafter, I shall consider only the algorithmic representation
although the two are completely equivalent and their duality reveals important
relationships between the evolution of a system and the evolution of instruments
observing that system.
Since S is the probability that at least one program will cause a physical system
ito halt on some state s  0 S at some moment in the history of our universe, S is the
0probability that u  will occupy all those states that it does occupy during its entire history
given the set of states that it might possibly have occupied.  The statement appears
0tautological.  Surely, the only possible states that u  could occupy are those states that
it does occupy at some point in its history?  Does S = 1?  No.  List all the states that the
universe ever does occupy in sequence and map that sequence into the subset
+,x CTù  / {(ù,+,x)} 0 ù.  The mapping is an isomorphism because ù  / {Church-Turing
0computable numbers} f {(ù,+,x)} and, per Theorem II-2, the set of all states of u
CTequals ù .  But Gödel-1 asserts that {(ù ,+,×)} d ù.  Hence S < 1.
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(V-2)
0 CT,Because all states ever occupied by u  are members of ù  per Theorem II-2
one might suppose that any law of physics has the form
where U is the functional form of a UTM in the algorithmic representation of a system. 
However, such is not the case.  V-2 does not in itself determine the precise value of the
n i i i-1 0state s  for any specific physical system.  Define the bit-strings s  / (s ,s ,þ ,s ) and*
i -1 i-1 i-2 0 i i -1s  / (s ,s ,þ ,s ).  Note that K(s ) $K(s ).  The algorithmic complexity of a bit-string* * *
is only determined to within a machine-dependent additive constant.  Therefore the
i i -1conditional algorithmic complexity of s  given s  is* *
(V-3)
UBecause the a  specify the number of bits required to describe the hardware
parameters of the particular TPM upon which a computation is performed, the values of
uthese parameters are given by log (a ).  Thus V-2 itself only determines the value of-1
i i,i-1the state s  to within a multiplicative constant a  with the magnitude unity when
 and  when .  V-2 now becomes
(V-4)
V-4 tells us that if a system has evolved through a sequence of states
n-1 n-2 0(s ,s ,þ,s ), then, in the presence of some appropriate physical circumstances
n,n-1 n nspecified by a , the system will evolve into some next state s .  s  need have no
n-1 n-2 0properties in common with any other state in the sequence (s ,s ,þ,s ).  V-4 reveals
the evolution of a system through an expanding set of points in CON space illustrated in
Figure IV-1.
n n-1 0Notice that there exists some {a ,a ,þ,a } that is the minimal set of constants
irequired to compute the evolution of the system.  Since K(s ) is only determined to*
within a machine-dependent additive constant, each element of the minimal set is
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necessarily incomputable by U from any subset of the set that does not include the
idesignated constant a .  U can compute any number that it is possible to compute but it
n n-1 0cannot compute the elements of {a ,a ,þ,a } because, as mentioned above, the
number of bits addressing its programs are only determined by the formalism of U to
iwithin the machine-dependent constant.  It follows that the minimal set {a } must be
algorithmically random.   Quite simply there is nothing in U specifying whether a
particular computation is being performed on an abacus, an electronic or a quantum
computer.  The information defining what physical computer is being employed must be
iadded to U ad hoc.  This deficiency is revealed by the incomplete definition of K(s ).*
i,i-1,The constants, {a }, constitute symmetry-breaking parameters  because they
designate one state from among all possible states of a system to be the next state of
0 n,n-1the universe, u .  a  is symmetry-breaking because U remains invariant under the
n,n-1substitution of all possible values of a  in V-4.  U (including all prior incorporated
i,i-1a ,for i<n) is symmetric with respect to the set of all possible next states of a system
i -1because the bit string s  always remains what it is; it is unaffected by the computation*
i n,n-1of the state s .  Once a  has been specified, it is incorporated as an axiom in the laws
i iof physics required to compute the state s  even though, prior to the computation of s , it
was completely independent of those laws.  As mentioned earlier, logical cohesion
i,i-1requires that an a  cannot be removed from the laws of physics even if it is never
again employed in the computation of any other state.39
i,i-1What do the constants, {a }, represent?  It is useful to expand the recursion V-4
explicitly:
(V-5)
i,i-1 i-1,i-2 1,0Since both (V-4) and (V-5) assume that each a U(a þa  ) is the minimal program
i i -1 n 0to generate s  from s , (V-5) is the minimal program to generate s  from s .  V-5
considers the evolution of a system as a chronological sequence of states; however, at
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(V-6)
nany given time, t , logical cohesion requires that the system is performing computations
with all programs of length or algorithmic complexity n or less steps.  Grouping each
member of the sequence by program length, , the spectrum of states
n n n-1 0s = (s ,s ,þ ,s ) has the algorithmic representation:* 
i 0Each s  corresponds to the halting of a program consisting of i+1 steps.  s  is the zero
length program, a constant, consisting just of one step: namely the printing of that
constant.  Any system must contain at least one such constant; otherwise, it is only a
vacuous formalism that never computes any particular number or state.
i,i-1Because U is a universal computer and the a  are only constants,  one can40
collect the constants together outside the domain of U.  V-6 becomes
(V-7)
i,i-1What are the a  in V-7?  Since V-7 portrays the simultaneous concatenation of
possible computational results from the operation of U in its next computation and since
U can be programmed to perform any formal mathematical operation except the
i,i-1computation of algorithmically random numbers, each a  constitutes the conditional
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halting probability that, if U has not halted on a program of i-1 steps, then it will halt on a
i,i-1program of i steps.  But I have shown that the a  are algorithmically random.  Hence
i,i-1the a  correspond to the algorithmically random symmetry-breaking individual digits of
i i,i-1 i-1,i-1 2,1 1,0Chaitin’s halting probability, S.  Setting a/a a  þ a a  we have:
Theorem V-1:
                      (V-8)
with .
How are halting probabilities related to the familiar constants of nature such as h,
N vac i, i-1G  and c ?  Notice that the incomputability of a  implies that the next tape symbol
could be either “0” or “1” for no determinable reason at all.  That is only possible if
i iP (“1”=property  is “on”=TPM halts on a program of length i) = P (“0”=property  is
“off ”=continue) = ½.  Thus the generation of digits on the tape constitutes a Bernoulli
½-process and the relations between different digits for strings with more than one digit
must be distributed as the binomial distribution with P(1) = P(0) = ½.  The same
conclusion follows on information-theoretic grounds.  It is not possible to gain more
information about the next state of a system than to go from a condition where the next
state is incomputable to one where that state is computable.     The Bernoulli41
½-process provides the maximum amount of information that can be gained from the
observation of a process characterized by a two-valued variable.  In short,  and
 for all i.   For an n-ary system with n primitive symbols in its alphabet rather42
than the two symbols “0" and “1", the distribution is multinomial with P(i)=1/n for all i. 
The number of primitive symbols in the alphabet will be called the symbolic base of the
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system.
The finding that all  would appear to contradict my thesis that the
constants of nature are random.  It does not because the sequence of program lengths
for programs that cause U to halt vary randomly as in a perfect coin toss.
In V-6 and V-7 programs are grouped by program length.  What is program
U ilength,  ?  By definition it is the algorithmic complexity, K (s ), of the minimal program
i 2 ithat computes s .  Its value is log (s ) plus the number of bits required to encode U.  But
inotice in V-8 that the program for s  is comprised of the number of bits encoding U plus
ithe number of bits encoding S .  If we let .  Since K
is always a positive number, it follows immediately that .  In other
i iwords, program length for s  is the negative logarithm of the halting probability S  for the
iprogram computing s .
iHow does K(s ) manifest itself?  How is it measured?  Recall that the length of a
program is the number of steps executed by U before it halts having produced a result. 
If we define time to be a count of the number of theorems proved or the number
computational results performed by U, U takes the same “time” to carry out a
computation of one step or n steps: namely, one theorem proved regardless of the
number of steps required to prove that theorem.  This definition of time corresponds to
the normal concept.  As a result of the motion of its springs and the irreversible pawls of
its escapement, a clock proves the theorems whose values are 1,2,þ, each of which is
itself defined to be the cumulative count of the number of theorems proved by the clock. 
It is essential to point out that there is no way to tell how long each tick takes except by
calibrating the duration of each computation by a clock relative to those performed by
some other clock.  It follows that K is a count of the number of steps carried out by U
per computational result achieved by U, that is, per unit time relative to the
0 icosmological clock u  which ticks no more than once every Planck second.  Thus K(s )
iis the frequency, < , of the computation .
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 This definition of frequency seems counterintuitive but is not.  For example, one
does not assert that n pulses of high frequency light take longer to occur than i , i<n,
pulses of low frequency light.  Rather, during the unit time in which our clock has
performed one computation (“tick”), our observing instrument has registered n pulses. 
0The only difference is that, insofar as u  is concerned, we have no external clock
0against which to judge the rate of theorem proving by u  except with reference to some
0subsystem of u  itself.  Here time is measured in terms of U ’s own clock which “ticks”
once every time U completes a computation (halts) and produces the result that U uses
as input for its next computation.
It is very important not to confuse the frequency of a computation defined above
iwith the halting probability that U will compute s  as its next result.   The common43
identification of probabilities with the relative frequency of a given event’s occurrence
within a sample of events is the source of many difficulties in probability theory.  The
halting probability is simply a primitive concept quantifying the likelihood that U will halt
i inext on a program of algorithmic complexity K(s ) or frequency < .  Although the
frequency of a computation and the probability of that process’s occurrence are
completely different, they are, nevertheless, intimately related:
Theorem V-2:                                (V-9)
iiLike S , <  is a pure number; only when calibrated with reference to some standard
computer (a clock) does it assume the dimension of reciprocal time.44
0 0In V-8 there remains just one constant to consider: namely, s =a .  It is the
length of the zero step program.  It is just the arbitrary length of the quantum tape
segment, h, necessary for the consistent operation of the laws of physics.  The
arbitrariness of h follows from the scale invariance of the laws of physics that is a
consequence of the universality of U.  If we now provide U with the program “Ch
and  ” / “multiply by the constant h and map ”, V-8
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becomes
(V-10)
i indicates the state s  transformed by the above program.  If, as I shall argue in §VI,
0the logical constant h  corresponds to Planck’s constant, then  : that is, the
i“energy” of the program generating s .  Hence
Corollary V-1: (V-11)
Corollary V-1 enables one to define the temperature, T, of an ensemble of
programs as the average energy of the ensemble.
Definition V- 4: Provided that the set of all of programs comprising an ensemble
0is definable, the temperature, T, of the ensemble of programs is h  multiplied by
the average program length of the ensemble.
 Given Definition V-4 one can construct other thermodynamic properties characterizing
Bthe ensemble.  For example, the thermodynamic entropy, S,  of the ensemble is just k45
Bmultiplied by the average program length of the ensemble.  k  is Boltzmann’s constant
expressed in bits.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop the thermodynamics
of computation in any detail except to make the following observation concerning the
temperature of an ensemble of undecidable or algorithmically random states.
Consider a system comprised entirely of algorithmically random programs. 
These are just zero length programs.  In fact, from the zeroth entry in V-9, the programs
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o 1 2 iare just arbitrary constants h ,h ,h ,þ,h ,þ bearing no algorithmic relation to each other. 
From V-10 it is evident that the energy of each member of the ensemble is zero and
hence the temperature of the entire undecidable ensemble is .   In other
words, the temperature of a set of algorithmically random, mutually undecidable states
of a system is 0 K.  Furthermore, the Third Law of Thermodynamics, which is the zerotho
B 0entry in V-9, when k  is substituted for h  asserts that if , then  .  
The zero entropy of the set of undecidable states of a system tells us that the set has
no microstates.  That is, the set of undecidable states of a system acts like a single
state.  Such is to be expected from the definition of undecidability.  If all members of a
set of states are mutually undecidable, there is no algorithm for differentiating between
one member of the set of such states from another.  Were such not the case, then each
undecidable state would be decidable by the rule that distinguishes it.
Given the incompleteness of the laws of physics, the singleton nature of a set of
undecidable states is important because it implies that the complete ensemble of all
states comprising E is normalizable relative to any decidable subset of E; that is, the
ensemble of all states of E acts like all the decidable and therefore differentiable states
oof u  plus a single program of length zero.  It is this characteristic of undecidable states
that satisfies the proviso in the definition of temperature.  Were such not the case, it
would be impossible to calculate a finite value for the temperature or any other
ofunctional property of u .  That is, the laws of physics would appear to be algorithmically
random even though they are consistent.
Because the proviso is met, the temperature of E equals the temperature of its
o odecidable subset, u .  However, E consists of the decidable set of states, u , with
temperature  plus a single undecidable state U  with temperature . 
o oTherefore U exerts a negative pressure or suction on u  causing u  to expand in CON
ospace.  The presence of U within E is manifest in u  by the irreversible randomly timed
i,i-1 oincorporation of the constants, a , in the mathematical laws governing u .  As a result,
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the Turing mechanical version of the Second Law of Thermodynamics becomes “The
number of arbitrary, symmetry-breaking constants in the laws of physics is an
algorithmically random monotonically increasing convex function of time.”  Alternatively,
oa symmetry once broken can never be globally restored for u .
VI. Genomic Evolution: The Growth of Order out of Randomness in the Planck Era
The randomness of the laws of physics implied by theorem V-1 seems to
suggest that an objective search for order in our universe by physics or any other
science will fail.  Such is not the case.
Consider first the question of objectivity.  The following corollary is an immediate
consequence of Theorem V-1 since the randomness of the digits of S are sufficient for
the consistent operation of U.
i,i-1Corollary VI-1: Given PMP and given elements of {a } corresponding to digits
i,i-1of S, U operates consistently when supplied with any input program a .
i,i-1Provided one can experimentally determine the value of at least one a , then we know
i,i-1that U can consistently compute an infinite number of states of a system S = a ½U. 
All but 2  of these states will be repetitions of the 2  states that a law of physics ofi i
i,i-1 i,i-1algorithmic complexity i can compute.  The algorithmic randomness of each a 0{a }
makes possible all laws of physics even as it makes each law incomputable in advance
from any other law.  Without the existence of random facts — which, by their very
randomness, cannot be manipulated by any preconceived rationale and must be
accepted by any being in any specific universe as the “way things are”— objective
knowledge could not exist.  In this view, consistency and objectivity are two sides of the
same coin.  Algorithmic randomness makes possible a decision between two alleged
outcomes of any logical reasoning.  Without Corollary VI-1 science would be
impossible.
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While Corollary VI-1 establishes the existence of objective laws of physics, it
might be the case those laws would be so complex as to be incomprehensible.  Indeed,
i,i-1given the randomness of {a } and given the incompleteness of (ù,+,x), the complete
laws of physics for E are incomprehensible; they cannot be expressed in a finite
number of symbols related by a finite number of operations.  On the other hand, in
actuality we do comprehend an extraordinary compass of the physical universe in
precise detail ranging from elementary particles to superclusters of galaxies.  How is
that possible?
The problem of comprehensibility is not just of concern to scientists.  Given PMP,
if the laws of physics were too complex, elementary particles, let alone biological
organisms, could never compute their next state because it would take more than the
lifetime of the universe for each particle to process all the interactions among all other
particles of the universe.  No particle or organism would ever change its state.
Why can we understand the behavior of parts of the physical world without
incorporating the properties of every elementary particle in the Universe?   Why is the46
physical world comprehensible in terms of a few relatively simple mathematical
relationships? There are two aspects to this problem: first, when is it legitimate to
0consider the behavior of a system in isolation from other systems comprising u ;
second, why can we often comprehend the behavior of relatively complex systems
comprising subsystems of very different types or scales?  The first aspect concerns the
property of algorithmic locality; the second concerns the rate of evolution of the laws of
physics.
i,i-1Definition VI-1: A system, S, is algorithmically local if S =  a qU.
i,i-1Thus a system is algorithmically local if knowledge of a  and U is sufficient to decide
i,i-1(predict) all possible states of S.  Corollaries VI-2 and VI-3 assert that a qU is indeed
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an algorithmically local system.
i,i-1 Corollary VI-2: Given U, in the constants of nature basis, S =  a ½U is
i,i-1 algorithmically local; given I, in the initial conditions basis, S = s ½I is
algorithmically local.
i,i-1Because each digit, a , of S is incomputable from any other, algorithmic locality
is guaranteed by the randomness of the digits of S given knowledge of U.  The second
clause of Corollary VI-2 asserts that, when designing an experiment, one does not have
to take account of the properties of every other observing instrument in the universe
including the interactions of elementary particles that constantly “observe” each other in
the course of proceeding from one state to the next.
i,i-1 i,i-1 Corollary VI-3: Given any a , all possible states of S = a ½U are
i ,i-1computable by U; given any s , all possible outcomes of an experiment
i ,i-1S = s ½I are computable by I.
i,i-1 0If we know a , the ability to comprehend any subsystem of u  depends only on
our knowing the Turing-Post programs that define U.  Corollary VI-3 does not imply that
it is possible to construct a finitistic “Theory of Everything” that is applicable for the
0 i,i-1entire history of u  because it is conditioned by the proviso “given any a ”. 
Corollary VI-3 suggests that the laws of physics are scale invariant, a property
sometimes equated with the universality of physical law.
Definition VI-2: The scale of a system is the number of distinguishable
i,i-1states, , computable by a ½U.  Alternatively, the scale of a system is the
i,i-1algorithmic complexity, , of the set of all states computable by a ½U.
The equivalence of the two versions of Definition VI-2 to within an isomorphism
is apparent when we consider that a program for computing a number is that number. 
The program for a number is simply a compact way of writing it.  For example, the
number 10  takes about 32 million bits to write out (address) longhand; however,10,000,000
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the program “multiply the number 10 by itself ten million times” only requires about 38
bits to write out.  Nevertheless, so far as U is concerned, both the program and the
longhand number are the same entity in that each causes U to perform the same
computation and come to the same result when read by U as input on a tape.  The
isomorphism between the two versions of a system’s scale is .
Because the randomness of the constants of nature (Theorem V-1) guarantees
i,i-1 i,i-1the independence of each a  from any other, the only component, other than a ,
irequired for computing the states of any system, S , is U or I.  Hence
Corollary VI-4: The laws of physics are scale invariant; they preserve their form,
scale i,i-1 j,j-1U, under any transformation T :a ÷a  over constants of nature space in the
0algorithmic representation of u  and they preserve their form ,I, under any
scale i,i-1 j,j-1transformation T :s ÷s  over initial conditions space in the instrumental
0representation of u .
Corollary VI-4 asserts that the laws of nature must have the same simple form for small,
large, simple or complex systems: namely, U or I conjoined to the idiosyncratic bits
i,i-1 scale i,i-1 j,j-1addressing the particular scale a .  Under the transformation T :a ÷a , only the
number of bits required to express the constants defining each scale is increased from
 to .  Hence or, equivalently, .  
The fraction within the parentheses is the ratio of the number of macrostates 
j,j-1computable by U from the macroscale constant a  to the number of microstates
i,i-1 j,icomputable by U from the microscale constant a .  In other words, it is the quantity W
of classical thermodynamics for CON space.  The subscript indices j and i, j>i, are
j,j-1appended here to indicate that  W is determined relative to the scales defined by a
i,i-1and a  whereas in thermodynamic treatments the algorithmic complexity of the units
(e.g. atoms in a gas) is implicitly assumed to be unity.   Hence .  If we47
scale Bmultiply T  by k , one obtains Boltzmann’s equation, , for entropy
expressed in bits.  Because constants of nature are always added to the laws of
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0physics but never deleted therefrom, the entropy of u  increases over time; however, in
CON space unlike the phase spaces of statistical mechanics, the increase of entropy of
0u  is absolutely irreversible.  There is no Poincaré recursion in CON space.  As stated
at the conclusion of §V, in Turing Mechanics, a symmetry once broken can never be
0globally restored for u .
In sum, because the constants of nature are algorithmically random, it is always
0legitimate to consider the behavior of a system in isolation from the rest of u , provided
that the laws of physics are formulated as the Turing-Post rules U or I and provided that
consideration is restricted to those phenomena deducible from just a single constant
i,i-1a .  However, experimental conditions often span many scales.  For example, the
observation of microscopic “quantum” systems by “classical scale instruments.
scaleAs a brief aside in light of the foregoing discussion of T , it is appropriate to
consider the connection between Planck’s equation  and Boltzmann’s equation
ji expressed in bits.  < equals program length, ; W  is the halting
j*iprobability, S , for programs of scale j relative to programs of scale i.  But, as we have
seen earlier, .  This suggests that Planck’s equation and Boltzmann’s
equation are simply two different representations of the same process: namely the
halting of U on a program of length .  Planck’s equation expresses the localized
mechanical energy manifest by the halting of U; Boltzmann’s equation expresses the
amount of information manifest by the halting of U as related to the probability that U
does halt on .  It looks as though Planck’s equation and Boltzmann’s equation mirror
the particle-wave duality of quantum mechanics except that the probability waves in the
Born interpretation of quantum mechanics become entropy waves in Turing
Mechanics.   In this context, there is one very significant difference between QM and48
TM: namely, in QM the Hamiltonian is invariant under unitary transformations whereas
0in TM, owing to the incompleteness of u , unitarity or probability conservation is not
strictly true unless one includes undecidable states among the possible values of an
observable.
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The conflation of scales in many experimental situations raises the second
aspect of the comprehensibility of nature and the evolution of natural laws.  Why can
we comprehend, perhaps not completely, complex systems spanning multiple scales? 
Part of the answer concerns the extent to which short (simple) programs provide a good
approximation to the full model of a multiscale system.  The bits for U or I remain the
same but, for a multiscale system, the arbitrary constant to which U or I is applied
consists of a long string of bits with “1” ’s and “0” ’s scattered throughout.  The
idistribution of halting probabilities for programs of length i, S , suggests why such
isystems are comprehensible: namely, S  = 2 .  That is, the shortest program- i
embedded within the multiscale arbitrary constant provides the most likely explanation
for the halting of U or I on any given experimental outcome.  Therefore,
Corollary VI-5: P(U halts) is maximal for the states of a system corresponding to
0 ithe first halting digit of S for u .  Furthermore, P(U halts*S  )is conditionally
maximal for the states of a system corresponding to the first subsequent halting
0digit of S for u  after the i  digit of S.th 49
Corollary VI-5 explains why perturbation techniques work well in physics: the first
term in the series approximation to a function corresponds to the shortest program in
the set of programs that we assert to model a physical system.  The corollary is the
algorithmic rationale for Occam’s razor.
0If the model proposed herein is correct, within its first Planck second u , was
governed by no laws and possessed no mass-energy.  Today it is characterized by
marvelously simple and seemingly timeless, universal laws governing the interplay of
immense quantities of matter and energy.  How did our universe get from there to here? 
Some evolutionary process must be at work.  The remainder of this section considers a
simple mechanism that may possibly account for the evolution of the universe from its
completely random beginning to its current highly ordered condition.
How rapidly do the laws of physics evolve?  How does the regularity that we
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observe throughout the universe come about if arbitrary constants can be added to the
laws of nature at any moment and on any scale from the smallest particle to the largest
supercluster of galaxies?  I shall now argue that the probability of such changes is
oextremely small and growing smaller with each computation by u .  Given that the set of
algorithmically random numbers dwarfs the set of compressible sequences of numbers,
this result would seem virtually impossible.  However, for any TPM consisting of U
coupled to a finite set of constants of nature, the set of all algorithmically random
numbers always appears to have only one element.  Hence the probability of a new
constant’s appearance as the result of any particular computation is generally very
small.  Why?
Before proceeding further it is necessary to define what one means by the
evolution of the cosmos.  Specifically, one must distinguish between two types of
evolution: symmetric or permutational evolution and symmetry-breaking or genomic
evolution.
Definition VI-3:  The set of programs of any given fixed length will be called the
genome for the scale of program length .50
Thus a genome consists of a fixed number of bits, each of which may assume different
values drawn from a fixed set of letters (formally, primitive symbols) comprising the
genome’s alphabet.  The number of symbols in a genome’s alphabet will be called the
genome’s symbolic base.  Any specific sequence of values occupying a genome’s
address bits constitutes a genotype or what I have elsewhere called a program.
Definition VI-4: Symmetric or permutational evolution is the interchange of
different letter values in one or more of the address bits comprising a genome.
Symmetric evolution is recognizable as the normal dynamical evolution of a
system except that it is an inherently random process.   The maximum rate of51
psymmetric evolution is one permutation/ computation-sec, t .  As discussed in §IV, the
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pvalue of t  is set by the values the fundamental tape constants h, G, and c.  The
process must be random because, were it not, then the number of address bits could
be reduced by some functional combination of the compressible bits until the values of
all bits comprising the genome are algorithmically random.  The randomness of
symmetric evolution not only agrees with quantum mechanics but also suggests that
the randomness of QM itself arises from the requirement that the mathematics of QM
be consistent.
It is classically asserted that a computer proceeds from the calculation of one
definite number to another.  For example, 2+1=3 might proceed to 3+2=5, etc. 
However, no physical computer always produces exactly the same number when a
given computation is repeated.  Rather, a distribution of numbers is produced that is
determined by the distribution of halting probabilities associated with the programs in a
computer’s repertory.   Corollary VI-5 explains why the classical result is so frequently52
observed: the distribution of halting probabilities is dominated by the halting probability
for the shortest halting program in the repertory.
Symmetric evolution is a conservative process.  By definition, the conserved
quantity is program length .  Since program length is the frequency of a process and
equals , conservation of energy follows automatically.  Per Nöether’s Theorem,
every conserved quantity in physics is associated with a symmetry.  In this case the
symmetry is the group formed by permutating values or primitive symbols among the
different address bits of a program’s genotype.  Thus each  genotype gives rise to a
symmetry group of particles and/or states of the system TPM  and the symmetric
evolution of a system is just the exchange of one member of the group for another.
 0It is to be observed that the symmetric evolution of TPM , if it occurs in u , is
complete in that every element of the group as well as combinations thereof can be
i,i-1 computed by the operation of U on the set of constants {a } associated with TPM . 
0When we assert that the laws of nature are unchanging, we mean that evolution of u  is
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only symmetric.   Given the incompleteness of (ù,+,x), that assertion is manifestly ruled
out even though symmetric processes may, in some circumstances, provide highly
0accurate approximations to the evolution of u  within a given scale era.
To incorporate the incompleteness of (ù,+,x) in the laws of physics it is
necessary to consider asymmetric or genomic evolution.
Definition VI-5: Genomic evolution is the addition of one or more address bits to
the address bits comprising a genome.
0Since the deletion of address bits from the genome for u  is prohibited by logical
cohesion, genomic evolution is also asymmetric and will be referred to as such on
occasion.  The converse of Nöether’s Theorem requires that genomic evolution not be
a conservative process since it is asymmetric.   Each step or mutation in the genomic
evolution of a system increases the length of the programs in the repertory of the TPM
and therefore necessarily increases the system’s total energy by h = h<.   Here  is
the total number of addressable bits after a mutation.  Genomic evolution is a
metamathematical process giving rise to programs none of which could be obtained
from the symmetric permutation of any of the ancestor genome(s).  The definition does
not rule out the genomic evolution of a zero bit program to a single or multiple bit
0program such as occurred within the first Planck second of u .  Indeed, instead of
conceiving genomic evolution as the addition of an additional address bit to an existing
multiple bit program, an alternative is to view genomic evolution as the addition of a
multiple bit program to a zero bit program.  From this point of view the addition of each
new set of constants to the laws of physics is a symmetry-breaking process. 
0Combining these two views, the first of which conceives of the evolution of u  to be the
0algorithmically random addition of new constants to the laws of physics for u  (logical
0tunneling) and the second of which conceives the evolution of u  to be a symmetry-
breaking of E, one must conclude that a symmetry-breaking of E gives rise to a new
0symmetry in u .
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To calculate the rate of genomic evolution in the course of any computation by a
TPM, it is sufficient to notice that one is not interested in the probability that a program
with specific heretofore incomputable values in each address bit will be incorporated in
the next computation.  Rather one seeks the probability that a new address bit will be
-1added to the bits addressable by TPM  regardless of the values occupying any of the
addressable bits.  It follows that the sample space consists of the set of possible
address bits.  Since the halting probability is defined in terms of halting on programs of
length 1, 2, þ plus the lengths of all programs of undecidable length, the sample space
has one element for each program length.  I have shown that the set of all undecidable
programs has only one element since there is no rule by which to distinguish between
0undecidable programs of different lengths.  Thus, at any given time in the history of u ,
the sample space contains one element for each of the currently addressable bits plus
one element for the set of programs whose length is undecidable.  Given these
0conditions, the following stochastic process models the genomic evolution of u  from an
algorithmically erratic condition within its first Planck second to the mathematically
effective condition that we observe today.
Consider an urn filled with one ball colored black to represent its undecidable
state. (Figure VI-1) The urn will always contain exactly one black (undecidable) ball
because (ù,+,x) is always incomplete but it will only contain one black ball because
there is no rule within (ù,+,x) by which to distinguish between undecidable states.
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Figure VI-1
Now imagine an invisible (metamathematical) hand reaching into the urn, picking
out a ball.  A disembodied voice inspects it and announces “the ball is black.” 
(Figure VI-2)  In so doing, the ball is transformed into a white ball, corresponding to a
decidable state simply because “the voice” has asserted that this particular ball is in
some decidable state called “black” by “the voice.”  The ball changes color (from black
to white) because its announced state (“black) is no longer undecidable.  This color
change corresponds to the process of logical tunneling.  Notice that, during the interval
in which the hand and disembodied voice are inspecting the ball and announcing “the
ball is black,” the state of whatever balls may occupy the urn is undecidable.  There is
no way, at that moment, to tell what the state of any ball in the urn might be.  As shown
in Figures VI-1 through VI-3, the process of withdrawing a ball from the urn, inspecting
it, and then returning it to the urn corresponds to the three steps in a computation:
namely, reading some input bit from a tape, transforming the value of that bit, and
writing the transformed value of the bit onto the tape. 
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Figure VI-2
Figure VI-3
0The “hand” now returns the ball to the urn and the resulting state of u  is given by
Figure VI-3.
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Figure VI-4
Why does the inspected ball remain “white” when returned to the urn?  Shouldn’t
it revert to a black undecidable ball when it is replaced in the urn?  Owing to the
asymmetry of genomic evolution, the inspected ball remains white.  An undecidable ball
(black) may be converted into a decidable ball for “no reason at all,” but a decidable
(white) ball can never revert to an undecidable (black) ball owing to the requirement for
logical cohesion.
The “hand” now reaches into the urn a second time but on this occasion it only
has a 50% chance of drawing out a black ball.  After many draws, the state of the urn
looks like Figure VI-4:
UAfter n inspections the probability, P , of picking an undecidable state and
encountering a new arbitrary constant in the laws of nature characterizing a previously
0 Dundecidable property of u  is ; the probability, P , of picking a decidable state
of a type encountered previously is .  t is the number of inspections
that have occurred.
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(VI-1)
Figure VI-5
p pAt the present time, when t . 3x10 t  where t  is the Planck second, the chance60
of encountering an undecidable state is minuscule.   Thus the laws of physics appear
universal and unchanging to us.  Even at the end of the Grand Unification era, when
pt . 10 t , the laws of physics would have appeared remarkably stable.  The chance of8
then encountering an undecidable state would only be .1/10 .  However, such would8
not be the case had one been around to observe the universe within the first thousand
Planck seconds.  Within that period, algorithmic randomness of the laws of nature
would have been quite noticeable.53
If N(t) is the number of arbitrary constants required for the symmetric but only
0approximately complete model of u  at time, t, then
Graphically, that is
In Figure VI-5 N(t) ÷0, and dN(t)/dt÷4 as t ÷ 0 while dN(t)/dt ÷0 when t and
0N(t) ÷4.  Thus, within the first Planck second of u , the laws of physics are materially
undefined in that they contain no material constants and are completely unstable;
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(VI-3)
however, the laws become asymptotically stable over time even though the number of
constants in those laws becomes arbitrarily large.
At the present time, if our universe is typical of other universes that have
0survived at least as long as ours, the laws of physics for u  should contain
(VI-2)
arbitrary constants.  ( is Euler’s constant.  Do the symmetric laws of physics for our
time really contain 146 arbitrary constants?  If the “Standard model” of strong, weak,
and electromagnetic forces contains just nineteen free parameters , and even that54
many makes many physicists uneasy,  how is one to interpret the prediction of55
equation VI-2 that the laws of physics now contain 146 constants of nature?
Notice, as a consequence of Corollary VI-3, that properties of the scale created
0by a symmetry-breaking step in the genomic evolution of u  are fixed for all time.  Thus,
when calculating the number of algorithmically random constants required in a theory
0purporting to model u  up to and including the scale created by a symmetry-breaking,
one must determine the number of constants required at the time the
symmetry-breaking took place.  The Hadron era, when the forces modeled by the
0Standard Model first appeared as distinct forces began when u  was approximately 108
Planck seconds (10  seconds) old .   Hence the number of arbitrary constants in the-35 56
Standard Model should be
The agreement between VI-3 and the Standard Model which contains nineteen
free parameters plus the triplet h, G, and c specific to the Planck era may be only a
coincidence; nevertheless, it is surely merits further investigation.
 §V ending. d
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(VI-4)
The question remains what we are to make of the extra 127 free parameters
apparently required by VI-2 for a “complete” symmetric model of our universe in the
current era of its history.  At this point I can only speculate that these extra parameters
may define complex structures including life that have arisen since the onset of the
Hadron era.
0To summarize, the genomic evolution of u  will never be completed; however the
0pace of its evolution declines rapidly as u  ages while the compass of physical laws
increases exponentially.  Mathematically,
2N(t) is the number of states that can be formally generated by a TPM at time t.  log N(t)
is the number of bits required to address all the states of the system as well as the
number of free constants in TPM’s program at time t.
0In this section, I have modeled the genomic evolution of u  as the never ending
0accumulation of algorithmically random constants in the laws of physics applicable to u
0through the process of logical tunneling.  The process begins (Figure VI-1) with u  in an
undecidable state characterized by no laws at all for .  Given this
0characterization of u  for  and given that  for any ensemble of
undecidable states , we haved
pCorollary VI-6:   for t# t .
It should be recognized, of course, that the appearance of a finite duration of
0time characterizing the “creation” of u  is a retrospective view from our current position
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0in the history of u .  Were one actually present at that moment, there would have been
no duration at all until after the first “theorem” was proved by U when the Planck scale
constant tunneled to join U.57
N vacVII. h, G , c  and Other Evidence for the Consistent Evolution of our Universe
In §IV three logical constants, designated h, G, and c, were shown to define
material properties of a Turing machine tape that are necessary for the consistent
operation of any TPM to avoid overprinting on the tape.  The properties correspond to 
quantization, logical coherence, and maximum tape velocity respectively.  If the
Principle of Mathematical Physics (PMP) is valid, then, at very least, observations of our
0physical universe, u , must yield evidence that these three properties are manifest in
0the known laws of physics characterizing u .  If we can find constants of nature with
those properties, then that empirical finding would provide evidence for the existence of
0the tape properties necessary for the consistent operation of mathematical laws in u .  
N vacClearly, the empirically measured constants h, G , and c  manifest the three
0required properties.  h reveals the maximum divisibility or quantization of u  although
quantization occurs in action space and only incidentally in geometric space-time.  The
operations of TPM are quantized in action owing to our ability to perform rotations in the
axiom-theorem space of a formal system.  A formal system generates a set of formulae
(axiom-theorem space).  Some small number of these formulae are termed axioms. 
From them all other members of the set, called theorems, can be proved by the
application of U to the axioms.  However, any particular choice of axioms constitutes an
arbitrary representation of the formal system.  Many equivalents are possible and may
be constructed by replacing any given axiom with some appropriate combination of the
theorems in the initial representation.  The process of replacing axioms by
combinations of theorems is analogous to the rotation of basis vectors in a vector
space.  Hence the use of the term “rotations” in a logical context.  While the formulae of
axiom-theorem space remain the same regardless of which representation one
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employs, the number of steps required to prove formula B from formula A varies greatly
depending on the particular representation one employs.  In one representation the
computation of B from A will take many steps or units of computational time; in another
the computation will require only a few steps.  For example, in one representation the
computation might be performed with no intermediate steps by a single program of
length  whereas in another it might be performed in four steps by four programs of
1 2 3 4length  ,  ,   and  .  It is evident that conservation of program length between B
and A, or, equivalently, conservation of energy between state B and state A asserting
that , is only possible if the action product .  For any given
axiom-theorem space, there exists some minimal subset of formulae that will generate
all other elements of the space.  This subset comprises the smallest or orthogonal basis
set of axioms generating the space.  The elements of that subset are algorithmically
incompressible.  The cardinality of the minimal subset is, by definition, the algorithmic
complexity, K, of the space.  In the minimal representation the computation of B from A
requires the maximal number of steps required to perform the computation with each
step comprising the minimal program length possible within the given action-theorem
o ospace.  The minimal action product ( )@(t =1) =h  constitutes the quantization constant
0for a given axiom-theorem space.  For u , this constant is Planck’s constant, h.
The fact that the fundamental logical domain of physical computation is defined
in action-space not geometric space has been suggested by others.  Drawing on the
work of Gödel and Chaitin, Reginald Cahill, Christopher Klinger and their colleagues
have demonstrated that algorithmically incompressible interactions (self-referential
noise) between pseudo-particles modeled on Leibniz’s monads  give rise to enduring58
relationships between these monads similar to the discussion in §VI.  In their model,
these relationships constitute topological defects embedded in the derived three-
dimensional geometric space on which the events governed by classical and quantum
physics are played out.   The logical connection between consistency and59,60,61,62,63,64
quantization in action seems to have been anticipated by Turing.  In a footnote to his
1936 paper on the nature of computation,  Turing suggests that symbols must be65
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distinguishable in action space.  It appears Turing came very close to discovering that
Planck’s quantum of action may arise from the need to distinguish symbols in a physical
universe operating as a computer.  Unfortunately, since he was considering only the
design of idealized mathematical machines and not their application as an essential
basis for physical theories, he did not draw the conclusion that quantization is
0necessary for the consistent operation of a TPM in u .
vacThe empirically constant velocity of light in vacuo, c , clearly corresponds to the
logical tape parameter c.  Both specify the maximum velocity at which information can
be propagated through space in the case of light and along the machine tape in the
case of a TPM.
NG , Newton’s gravitational coupling constant, quantifies the cohesion of space-
time by determining the force or curvature of space that must be surmounted to
“escape” the gravitational field between one body and another each with given masses
separated by a spatial distance r.  The mass of each body corresponds, via Einstein’s
equation, , to a given energy.  That energy in turn corresponds to a program of
length =< =E/h.  But the cohesion of space-time is exactly what the logical constant G
expresses with respect to the Turing machine tape: namely, the conditions under which
the tape will tear and a TPM can no longer access the results of its past computations
0given the specific values of h and c characterizing u  for a given program of length . 
Notice that gravitation is the only purely attractive force between normal matter  as66
expected if it embodies logical cohesion.  Also, like logical cohesion, gravitation has an
infinite effective range subject to physical conditions under which space “tears.”  
Examples of such tearing may occur at the event horizon of a black hole or at the event
0 0horizon of u .  The event horizon of u  constitutes the logical boundary between
Ndecidable theorems and undecidable formulae.  For these reasons I conclude that G
0embodies the logical cohesion of u .  The extreme weakness of gravity relative to other
fundamental forces is an accidental consequence of the algorithmic randomness of the
0 i Nconstants of nature in u .  In another universe, u , G  could be much stronger or even
 Such is also a consequence of equation VI-4e
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weaker. 
With regard to the tearing of space-time or of the machine tape, it deserves
mention that were some segment(s) of the machine tape to be torn from others under
extreme conditions, the “floating” segment would be unable to “perform” any
computation; the segment would itself constitute an algorithmically random constant
iunless, somehow, it became attached as a new constant of nature to some universe, u . 
That possibility is determined by the halting probability for the length of the floating
segment.  On this basis it appears that laws of physics would not operate within the
event horizon of a black hole.  The possibility of a wormhole connection from the black
i 0hole to another universe u  or a reconnection to some other region of u  would be
inversely proportional to the length of the floating segment.  The larger a black hole is
the less likely it is that its interior will connect to another universe.  In the limit case for
0 0the totality of u  itself, it is virtually inconceivable, but not impossible, for u  to fuse with
i 0another universe u .   Only in this statistical sense can we say that u  is isolated from alle
iother decidable universes, {u }.67
N vacIn sum, the empirical appearance of the three constants h, G  and c  — the
only constants that can be combined to form units of mass, length and time defining the
conditions of our universe in the Planck era—suggests that the necessary condition for
the consistent operation of the laws of physics is met at the most elementary level of
our universe.  Therefore:
N vacConclusion VII-1: The constants h, G  , and c  with the properties of the logical
constants h, G, and c in the laws of physics constitute necessary evidence for
0the consistent operation of U and I in u . 
I have designated the foregoing a “conclusion” because, unlike the previous
theorems and corollaries, it can never be formally proved by U given the constants
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0characterizing u .  Rather, one can only assert that available evidence suggests the
Nlegitimacy of equating the logical constants h, G and c with the physical constants h, G ,
vacand c .  If that suggestion is accepted, then their presence in the laws of physics
0provides necessary evidence for the consistent operation of those laws in u .
What evidence would be sufficient to demonstrate the consistent operation of U
0in u ?  In §V, it was asserted that, if U is to operate consistently, then U cannot prove
every possible formula.   Specifically, U must not be able to formally derive specific68
values of the tape parameters differentiating one physical realization of U from another. 
In other words, one must be able to show that observed values of the constants of
nature in the laws of physics are algorithmically random.
On the face of it, considering the extent of CON space (Figure IV-1), the
N vacformulae h = 6.63x10  erg-sec, G  = 6.67x10-8 gm -cm -sec  and c  = 3.00x10-27 -1 3 -2 10
cm-sec  seem to be contingent.  Contingency implies that their truth can only be-2
determined experimentally.   There is nothing in the known formal relationships of69
physics, such as , that in any way determines the value of h given that E and <
must be allowed to range over all possible values.  As remarked in connection with
0 0Figure IV-1, if the constants characterizing u  were not contingent that implies u  is the
oonly decidable universe.  But were there only one decidable universe, u , then there
must exist a rule specifying why CON space is restricted to just the specific values of
0 0 o 0 00 0h , G , c  characterizing u  and no others.  Then, since h , G , c  would characterize all
decidable universes, they would be part of the program for U — a contradiction
because the constants must be algorithmically independent of U if U is to be consistent.
On the other hand, the constellation of values of the constants of nature seems
to exhibit a near miraculous fine tuning that gives rise to the delicate conditions under
which life could arise to evolve the human mind capable of looking out on the universe
and becoming conscious of the laws of nature that themselves gave rise the human
mind (the anthropic argument).  To some this fine tuning seems impossible without the
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presence of a designer or some convergent evolutionary process  determining the70
constants’ values.  However, the anthropic argument by design fails, even if that design
were a convergent stochastic process.  First, the complex structures of our universe
including life are only unusual and the necessity for a designer only arises if one
assumes that our universe is the only decidable universe.  As we have seen, such
cannot be the case if the laws of physics are to operate consistently.  Many other
universes could, and certainly have, developed structures at least as complex as those
in our universe but life in those universes would look very different than the life with
N vacwhich we are familiar.  Further, suppose that the observed values of h, G  , and c
were not contingent and could somehow be computed a priori by U.  Then one must be
able to determine experimentally some other values of these tape parameters, hN, GN,
and cN, that could not be computed by U if U is to operate consistently.  In that case, hN,
N vacGN, and cN would be merely renamed versions of h, G , and c .  In other words, the
designer or convergent process would operate inconsistently were the constants of
nature not algorithmically random at some scale of reality — again a contradiction.
N vacAnother argument in favor of the algorithmic randomness of h, G , and c  is
suggested by the remarks above.  Suppose one compiled all known laws of physics
together and then eliminated any redundancies by reducing the entries in the catalogue
to the minimum possible by including only those laws that can be proved to be
algorithmically independent of each other.  If the total number of variables and
vcc econstants in the catalogue, n , were greater than the number of equations, n , relating
vcc ethem, then n  - n  of the constants must be algorithmically independent and random
relative to the known laws of physics.  One would conclude that all available evidence
suggests the laws of physics operate consistently.  So far as we know, such is indeed
the case but hope persists among some who seek a “theory of everything” that we will
eventually be able to state all laws of nature in a finite set of equations containing no
inexplicable constants.  Of course, were such a hope realized, it would shatter those
very laws by rendering them inconsistent.  Thus this aspiration is an anathema to
physics but physics must, nevertheless, always seek it — if only to show that it is
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unattainable.  Once again, as was the case for the previous two arguments, were
arbitrary constants to be eliminated from the laws of physics a contradiction would
result since the derivations of the very laws that contained no such constants would
themselves be inconsistent.  Physics would have to rebuild all its findings from the
ground up to try to discover new laws containing arbitrary constants.  That attempt
might be unsuccessful since the procedure outlined in this paragraph is ultimately
founded upon the belief that nature is consistent.  Still the history of physics is replete
with surprises.  In the present state of our understanding, it is ultimately only a hope
that nature does not harbor the supreme deception: namely, that our belief in the
rationality of the Universe is illusion.
I now consider two physical arguments in favor of the randomness of the tape
N vacparameters.  First, the particular values of h, G  and c  that we employ or that a
physical system employs in its computations are only determined to within a certain
dispersion that is ultimately dependent on h.  I argued in §IV that the dispersion is
necessary to avoid inconsistency through overprinting on the machine tape.  As noted
by Turing,  overprinting can only be avoided by limiting the number of symbols in the71
alphabet of a language to a finite number of symbols.  The finite alphabet constrains
the number of digits by which the dispersion in a measurement is limited since each
successive digit defines an algorithmically independent program when fed into a TPM. 
Now consider an arbitrarily large system of interacting TPM’s.  Their measurements of
the dispersion will only converge on an average value with convergent estimates of the
dispersion of the average if the measurement programs of all TPM’s are mutually
consistent.  But that consistency itself requires the tape parameters of at least one TPM
to be algorithmically random otherwise the system would operate inconsistently.  In
other words, if one could determine a priori the values of the tape parameters there
would be no basis for a convergence by all TPM’s on the average values of the tape
parameters and their dispersion.  Thus the experimental fact that the measurements of
all observers converge on an average value of a constant provides evidence for the
54
0consistent operation of u  and also evidence for the algorithmic randomness of the
constants of nature.
Second, algorithmically random constants in the mathematical laws of physics
imply the existence of undecidable states in the complete Universe, E.  A uniquely
quantum phenomenon may provide direct evidence for undecidable states in E and
therefore indirect evidence for the presence of random constants in those physical
laws.  Decoherence arises from the interaction of the coherent wave function of a
quantum computer with its environment.  Decoherence is what makes things happen.  If
a wave function never decohered to the distribution of single values of an observable
that appear in our detectors, we would never observe anything.
Consider now our universe as a quantum computer with a wave function
described by the Wheeler-DeWitt equation.  If the universe described by this equation
0were complete, how could its wave function collapse or decohere to produce the u  that
we witness?  Since decoherence requires the interaction of a wave function with an
environment, the wave function of our universe or of the set of all decidable universes
must somehow interact with an “environment”—whatever that environment might be. 
The interaction cannot constitute an algorithmically compressible process because the
set of decidable universes, by definition, encompasses all states that can be computed 
given the specific constants of nature characterizing each universe at any given time in
its history.  On this basis, I suggest the phenomenon of decoherence provides evidence
that our universe, describable by and operating according to consistent mathematical
laws, is incomplete.  In §V one process was proposed by which the intervention of E in
0u  may occur: namely, the symmetry-breaking addition of algorithmically random
constants to the laws of physics (logical tunneling).
In sum, the foregoing analysis strongly suggests but does not formally prove the
following.
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N vacConclusion VII-2: The observed finite non-zero values of h, G  and c  are
algorithmically random and therefore their specific values in the laws of physics
oconstitute sufficient evidence for the consistent operation of U = I in u .
As was the case for Conclusion VII-1, I designate the foregoing to be a conclusion
because none of the arguments advanced heretofore can be formalized as a proof of
the conclusion and the arguments in favor of Conclusion VII-2 could be refuted by
future experiments.  Furthermore, all the arguments ultimately assume the very
consistency of the laws of physics that they seek to demonstrate.  Therefore, at best,
0they only provide strong indicators of the consistent operation of u  and of the
0randomness of the physical constants differentiating u  from all other decidable
universes.
In light of the foregoing limitations, one must ask whether there is any test that
could provide evidence for the algorithmic randomness of the constants of nature which
0does not assume the consistency of u  as part of its design?  A seemingly
insurmountable obstacle is the fact that there exists no algorithm capable of definitively
deciding whether or not a given finite string of binary digits drawn from an infinite binary
sequence is random in the Chaitin sense defined earlier.   A way around this obstacle72
may be to employ Per Martin-Löf’s measure theoretic definition of effective
randomness.  To determine whether a string is effectively random one subjects a string
to sequential tests for non-randomness.  If the string fails all tests (that is, no regularity
is detected), then the string is deemed to be Martin-Löf random.   Chaitin has shown73
that Martin-Löf randomness is equivalent to Chaitin (algorithmic) randomness in the
sense that, if a string is Martin-Löf random, it is Chaitin random and vice versa.   The74
existence of a test by which to determine whether the constants of nature are
Martin-Löf random is an  open question to be considered in a future paper.
Before ending this section the perspective of Turing Mechanics on two
contemporary issues in cosmology and physics deserves mention.  The first concerns
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the dark energy (DE) and the cold dark matter (CDM) that together are estimated to
constitute at least 95% of the total mass-energy of our universe.  Per Corollary VI-2
(algorithmic locality), the read-write head (language acceptor) of a TPM only scans one
segment of the tape at a time while performing a computation and writes the content of
the segment into the computer’s memory.  In addition to the bits storing U whose
contents remain unchanged from one computation to the next, the memory contains a
data register comprised of exactly the number of bits equal to program length
appropriate to the scale at which the TPM is operating.  The size of the data register
equals the scale size and no more or less in order to ensure algorithmic locality.   In75
the case of a Planck scale computer, the data register comprises just one bit; as argued
at the end of §VI, we expect the standard model to contain 19 free parameters in
addition to the three fundamental constants h, G and c which remain unchanged.  Thus
we should expect the data register of a hadron computer to comprise 19 bits.
Working from the data stored in its memory, the TPM performs a computation
0and writes the result on the tape giving rise to the phenomena that make up u .  So far
the computation process is thermodynamically reversible.  The TPM now reads 
another segment to begin the next computation.  However, before it can write the new
data in its memory, the TPM must erase from memory the data that provided input to
the prior computation.  Charles Bennett has shown that energy is dissipated when a
0computer’s memory is erased.   Where does this dissipated energy reside in u ?  It76
0cannot escape from u  because its density and temperature are not great enough to
drive a computation let alone tear the tape.  The answer is that it resides on the filled
tape trailing from the back end of the computer.  At this point it is necessary to recall
that the halting probability, S, for U is only defined for self-delimiting programs.  Self-
delimitation requires that all programs in the repertory defined by a constant of nature
be prefix-free.   That is, no program bitstring can be the prefix of another program77
string.   It can be shown that a prefix-free Turing machine must move in only one78
direction along the machine tape.   In other words, once a result has been written on79
the tape, the result is forever inaccessible to the TPM.  Bennett’s dissipated erasure
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energy seems to derive ultimately from the requirement that the set of programs
available to a computer comprises a prefix-free language.  My equation of the
dissipated erasure energy with the energy of past program results written on the trailing
tape suggests an interpretation of gravity.  Since G constitutes the coupling constant
that assures the machine tape can never be torn, I suggest that G defines the coupling
between the present state of U and its past history.  Thus, gravity may be the
geometrical manifestation of constraints placed by the past history of our universe upon
its present degrees of freedom.  In 1995  I argued that the history of our universe since80
its beginning is embodied in the erased mass-energy dissipated by Planck and higher
scale computers.  Therein I estimated that the erased mass-energy may constitute 89%
of the total mass-energy of our universe and proposed that the dissipated erasure
energy is a candidate for the “missing matter” whose gravitational effect was well known
but whose origin was unexplained by contemporary cosmological theory.  Since that
time, the comparison of redshifts and luminosities of distant Type 1a supernovae with
those of nearby Type 1a supernovae as well as the power spectrum of the cosmic
0background radiation has lead to the conclusion  that expansion of u  is accelerating. 81,82
It is believed that the acceleration is driven by the vacuum energy embodied in a
positive cosmological constant, 8.  In light of this discovery, my earlier result must be
reinterpreted.  It is now seen to refer the proportion of CDM to the total matter content
0 0of u  rather than to the proportion relative to the total mass-energy of u  as I originally
0supposed.  After correcting for a downward revision in the age of u  employed in my
prior work from 1.7x10  to the best current estimate of 1.4x10  years, we obtain cold10 10
erasure matter as 87.5% and normal computationally active matter as 12.5% of the
0matter content of u  respectively.  These calculations agree with best astronomical
estimates of the matter content of our universe: (29±4)% CDM; (4±1)% baryons and
~0.3% neutrinos.   Hence, from those estimates, one obtains 87% CDM/total matter;83
13% (baryons+neutrinos)/total matter.  What is the cold dark matter?  In Turing
Mechanics, it is simply the past states of all the currently existing baryons, neutrinos
and non-neutrino leptons.84
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To conclude these remarks on the cosmological missing mass-energy one
0further question deserves an attempt at an answer: namely, where does u  get the
endless supply of blank tape upon which to write the results of its computations?  There
0is no way that u  can recycle old tape and write new results on the freed-up space
because that would involve further erasure dissipation of energy which then has to be
dumped on some other “backup” tape held in some other part of the universe.   The85
answer is that blank tape is endlessly supplied from the undecidable formulae, â
0 i(Figure II-1) that complete E beyond u  and beyond all decidable universes, {u }.  As
0new constants of nature logically tunnel into u  from â, they generate an exponentially
0expanding tape space upon which u  can write the results of its computations.  The
“volume” of the tape space, that is the number of possible state values that can be
0 tcomputed by u  scales as  where n  is the number of constants in the laws of nature
0at time t.  However, if Equation VI-2 relating the number of constants to the age of u  is
0correct, then it should be possible to compute the deceleration parameter, q (t)<0 for
cosmological expansion.  I leave this topic for a future paper; however, these
considerations suggest that the expansion of tape space resulting from the logical
tunneling â ÷ö may be the source of the “dark energy” currently invoked to explain
cosmological acceleration.  Dark energy is estimated to constitute two-thirds of the total
mass-energy of our universe.86
The second contemporary issue concerns the claim of quantum mechanics and
its successors, quantum field theory and string theory, to be the fundamental style of
model by which to conceptualize physical reality.  This issue includes the problem of
resolving the relationship between large and small-scale systems.  Turing Mechanics
agrees with many results of quantum mechanics and of the classical mechanics of
relativity theory within their respective domains.  The concurrence between quantum
and Turing Mechanics is required if Turing Mechanics is to satisfy Bohr’s
Correspondence Principle; however, Turing Mechanics applies to every scale per
Corollary VI-4 (scale invariance).  Scale invariance implies that any formal distinction
between macroscopic and microscopic systems is unsustainable and that, when the
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laws of physics for macroscopic systems are cast in algorithmic form, macroscopic
quantum effects should reveal themselves.
Unlike its agreement with quantum mechanics, Turing Mechanics is in
fundamental logical disagreement with classical continuum mechanics.  
Corollary VII-1: The operation of a physical system according to continuous
mathematical laws is inconsistent. 
Corollary VII-1 is a direct consequence of the prohibition against tape
overprinting discussed in §IV.  The corollary asserts that if a physical system were to
operate according to the classical continuum mechanics of Newton and of Einstein,
then its operation would be inconsistent.  Thus the disagreement between classical and
quantum mechanics goes deeper far than the experimental failure of classical physics
in the microscopic realm of Planck quanta.  While quantum mechanics could constitute
both a conceptual model of the physical world and of the processes by which it
operates,  classical physics could never do so.  Classical continuum physics constitutes
a stunning conceptual model that can never correspond to the operations of physical
reality if those operations are to be consistent.
VIII. Conclusion: Physics in the Random Universe
In order to understand why physical reality is quantized, it was suggested herein
that one must first answer the question posed by Eugene Wigner: How can one
account for “the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences?”  87
In response it was proposed, as an hypothesis to be empirically tested (PMP and
Theorem II-2), that nature is a mathematical machine in the sense defined by Church
and Turing.  The finite non-zero value of Planck’s quantum of action, h, of Newton’s
N vacconstant of gravity, G , and of the velocity of light in vacuo, c , provide evidence
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necessary for the consistent operation of objective mathematical laws governing our
universe (Conclusion VII-1).  Consistency requires the presence of algorithmically
random, symmetry-breaking constants in the laws of physics of any universe.  At any
i ngiven time, t , these constants correspond to the first n digits, S , of Chaitin’s Halting
Probability, S  for our universe.  Thus the specific values of these constants for our
universe can only be determined by experiment.  It was argued (Conclusion VII-2) that
N vacobserved specific values of the physical constants h, G  and c  must be members of
an algorithmically random set of constants in the laws of physics.  Therefore their
observed values and those of all other constants of nature provide sufficient evidence
0for the consistent operation of u .  It was suggested that the Martin-Löf measure of
effective randomness may provide the means by which to rigorously demonstrate the
algorithmic randomness of the constants of nature.  However, in keeping with Gödel’s
Second Theorem, it may turn out that such a demonstration is intrinsically impossible.
Theorem V-1 paints a paradoxical picture of our attempts to understand the laws
of physics and the mathematical operations of physical systems.  On the one hand, the
laws of physics are alleged to constitute random facts; on the other hand, the
randomness of these facts (the constants in the laws) is necessary and sufficient for
their consistent and, therefore, lawful operation.  In addition, the randomness of
physical laws is necessary and sufficient for algorithmic locality (Corollary V-2), local
completeness (Corollary VI-3), scale invariance (Corollary V-4) and simplicity
(Corollary VI-5).  The random constants are not dei ex machina.  Precisely because
they are random, they cannot be employed to willfully paper over ignorance of the
physical universe.  Quite the opposite, the randomness of these constants and
therefore the randomness of the laws of physics themselves ensures the objectivity of
our knowledge because their values are beyond all computation.  They can only be
discovered by experiment.  They are brute facts that no being can change.  All the
computing power in our universe and even in all decidable universes cannot ordain their
0values.  Come when they may for no reason at all, our universe, u , must simply await
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the arrival of the next constant of nature from the complete Universe E.  The Universe
is its own explanation.
Should the findings of this paper be sustained under scrutiny by others, then the
following conclusion would appear inescapable: one of the most perplexing scientific
discoveries of the twentieth century, Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, while seeming
to limit our knowledge of the physical world, may actually be required for any knowledge
of the order in nature.  We have seen that the finite non-zero value of h appears to be
necessary for the consistent operation of the laws of physics.  Some physicist, I believe
it to be John Barrow but can’t be certain, has written that the name “Uncertainty
Principle” is a misnomer.  It should be called the “Certainty Principle” for the following
reason.  In classical Newtonian physics, almost all orbits are unstable.  The slightest
perturbation in initial conditions or from external influences can catapult a system into
wildly chaotic behavior for which no prediction is worth more than a German mark in the
1930's.  Not so the atoms of quantum mechanics.  Thanks to the Uncertainty Principle
and the non-zero constant of action h, the electron remains bound to the proton in an
hydrogen atom for almost all time.   Herein I have suggested that the influence of the88
Uncertainty Principle and the quantum of action runs far deeper than the mere stability
of atoms.  Without them, there would be no laws of nature because the operation of any
universe would be inconsistent.
The view that order and randomness in nature are intimately related is not new
to physics.  It is the foundation of quantum theory.  What is new is the position that
randomness is necessary for any order in the physical universe.  Others have come to
the same conclusion: notably Cahill, Klinger and their colleagues in the work cited
earlier.  The role played by monads in their work is analogous to the role played by
meaningless tape symbols in this paper; the random generation of persisting n-ary
relationships between monads in their work corresponds to the spontaneous
incorporation of symmetry-breaking constants in the laws of physics herein.
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The view that there may exist more than one universe, indeed an infinite number
of universes, each governed by its own laws of physics, is also not new.   However, 89,90
Turing Mechanics is controversial.  Does it constitute a scientific theory?  The question
is paramount because the theory implies that the complete Universe consists almost
entirely of undecidable states beyond the compass of any rational or algorithmically
compressible program.
To qualify as a scientific hypothesis, 
• A theory must be objective.  It must constitute a formal mathematical theory
whose symbols are independent of varying interpretation by one investigator or
the next.
• It must be consistent.  In order to be consistent, the theory must include as an
independent axiom at least one formula (symbol-coded fact of nature) that can
only be determined on the basis of experimental evidence.
• It must be refutable.   The theory and its derived theorems must contain at least91
one formula which distinguishes it from any other theory.
• It must not be vacuous.  The refutable formula must be shown to correspond to
some observed state of a physical system.
Turing Mechanics satisfies all four criteria.  Since it is a formal theory, its
theorems and predictions are objective because U and I are universal computers.  The
constants in the laws of physics are objective because they are beyond manipulation
and because they are formally incomputable except when incorporated as ad hoc
axioms in those laws.  Second, because Turing Mechanics contains algorithmically
random constants, it is consistent.  Third, since these constants are algorithmically
random, at least one formula in any specific realization of the theory is necessarily
distinct from all other formulae generated by all other physical realizations of Turing
Mechanics.  Thus the theory is refutable.  The theory is not vacuous.  It is a fact that we
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vac Ndo exist in that we measure the values of h, c  and G .  In sum, Turing Mechanics
constitutes a scientific theory.
It may be objected that the Principle of Mathematical Physics and Theorem II-2
conflate human procedures for computation with the dynamical evolution of physical
realty.  The latter, so it is alleged, is certainly different than the action of any human
being doing sums.  This challenge raises the infamous mind-body problem of
Descartes.   How are our minds and thoughts connected to the physical world?  We92
are, after all, part of the world and the existence of those thoughts can only be
explained if that fact is taken into account.  In this paper I have attempted to surmount
the mind-body problem by hypothesizing that human procedures for computation and
the dynamical evolution of a physical system are, indeed, the same.  Thus I account for
the effectiveness of mathematics in the physical sciences.  It is important to notice,
however, that the principle only asserts that human computation and physical evolution
have the same form.  In all other respects they are as irreducibly different as counting
on your fingers is different from the operation of the personal computer upon which I
am writing: your fingers and this PC are each characterized by different constants of
nature.  Whatever its virtues or limitations, the Principle of Mathematical Physics is only
an hypothesis.  It is only viable if it works.
In this paper four examples were provided to support the thesis that the universe
can be conceived as a consistently operating mathematical machine, TPM.  First, the
observed presence of algorithmically random constants in the laws of nature implies
0that TPM operates consistently.  Second, the phenomenon of decoherence for u  as a
0whole seems to predicate the existence of an environment for u .  That environment
can only be the undecidable states that complete the Universe, E.  Third, the mass-
energy of erased states created as a TPM clears its memory from one computation to
the next was calculated and closely approximates the best astronomical estimates of
0the CDM fraction of the matter content of u .  Fourth, logical tunneling of constants from
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â ÷ö in Turing Mechanics could be the source of the “dark energy” driving the
0accelerating cosmological expansion of u .
The constellation of the constants of nature that the anthropic principle purports
to explain is extraordinary.  Unpredictable in advance, in hindsight the finely tuned
values of these constants have made possible the exquisite relations that give rise to
life on earth and the practice of science itself.  But the truly unfathomable beauty of our
situation is not those relations.  It is that, were the laws of physics not random, then our
universe could never come into being and flower as it has.  Herein I have suggested
that our circumstance can only be accounted for if we posit an heretofore unrecognized
category of existence: namely undecidable states of our universe.  Since Gödel,
undecidable truths have been recognized as a proper category of mathematical
existence.  If the laws of physics can always be expressed mathematically, it seems
difficult to avoid the conclusion that they inhabit physical reality as well.
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can bring the constants outside the parentheses as in V-7.
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as employed in computation theory is apparent from the following: In probability theory
when we speak of the (relative) frequency of an event a we mean that in a set of y
a aevents a occurs x  times and it does not occur y -x  times.  In computation theory, per
the definition given in the text, we speak of an event’s frequency when the event a
recurs x times in a given unit time.  In the latter case there is no reference at all to a’s
non occurrence.  In sum, frequency in probability and frequency in computation are very
different even though they are functionally related as shown in Equation V-9.
The origin of the confusion between the two concepts of frequency derives from
the fact that the halting probability for a long program is less for a long program than for
a small program.  Hence the belief that short programs take less time to carry out than
long programs.  Because U halts less frequently on long programs than short programs 
a long program seems to take longer to perform than a short program.
44. GivenTheorem V-2, how can one account for high frequency processes that appear
to characterize the computations of quantum scale systems?  The answer is as follows.
The concept of frequency employed in Equation V-9 is always defined relative to each 
computer’s own clock (computations).  Thus if I am observing a hadron system and my
clock completes one computation/second whereas the hadron’s clock completes a
computation once every 10  seconds, then during one second of my time the hadron-35
system executes a program of apparent length  .10  steps relative to my clock even35
though, as we shall find in §VI, the maximum length program upon which a hadron can
operate relative to its own clock is estimated to be approximately 19 bits long.
It should be noted that the maximum program length or frequency capacity of a
i,j i,jvolume of tape space of length ct  is proportional to 2 .  t  is the number of theoremst
that system i (for example, a hadron) can compute in the time it takes system j (for
example, my clock) to compute one theorem.  When compared with the halting
iprobability S  = 2  for programs of length t, one obtains the program length frequency- t
power spectrum of 1/ f noise that characterizes fractal systems.  We should expect such
to be the case given the scale invariance of the laws of physics demonstrated in §VI.
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